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ABSTRACT (100-200 WORDS): This essay is a study on totalitarianism and 
genocide through the lens of historical manipulation and cultural behavior unique 
to Cambodia (later called Democratic Kampuchea under the Khmer Rouge). The 
purpose is to describe the cause and effect that colonial machinations and native 
social behaviors had on the development and perpetuation of the Khmer Rouge.
The study is limited by time and research capabilities, as I do not yet speak, read, 
or write Khmer or Vietnamese. Because the topic spans over two-hundred years, 
the research focuses on the two endpoints of colonialism and totalitarianism and 
neglects the time continuum in-between. It is a comparative project that weighs 
heavily on behavioral research as pulled from historical and anthropological 
studies on the area and people. The work is significant in that it attempts to bridge 
the gap between colonialism and Khmer Rouge by linking the events through 
cause and effect.
Totalitarian terror grows by leaps and bounds. It not only... [is].. .aimed 
at anticipating political resistance— it becomes the fundamental method 
o f achieving the revolution without which the regime would lose its total 
character and probably also its power. Totalitarian terror is therefore the 
vital nerve o f the totalitarian system... Because o f the belief o f the 
infallibility o f  its dogma, the regime is propelled toward an increase in 
terror by a violent passion for unanimity. Since history tells the totalitarian 
he is right, he expects others to agree with him. This passion for uniformity 
makes the totalitarian insist on the complete agreement o f the entire population.1
In our new Cambodian society there exist such life and death contradictions 
as enemies in the form o f various spy rings working for imperialism, and 
international reactionaries are still planted among us to carry out subversive 
activities against our revolution. There is also another handful o f 
reactionary elements who continue to carry out activities against, and attempt 
to subvert, our revolution. These elements are not numerous, consisting 
o f only 1 or 2 percent o f  our population. Some o f  them operate covertly 
while others are openly conducting adverse activities.2
Introduction: An Explanation of Colonial Events and their Contribution to the 
Development of Democratic Kampuchea
W
This paper proposes to study Khmer social practices and behavioral modes that enabled the 
Khmer Rouge to topple the Lon Nol regime and establish Democratic Kampuchea (DK), as well 
as attempt to dissect the Khmer Rouge’s vision of a pure, communistic haven. The methods by 
which the Khmer Rouge coerced the millions of Khmer citizens to obey their arbitrary rules have 
socio-cultural roots. Desiring respect and fearing a position as the lesser of two partners are 
traditional Khmer social schemes best identified in the patron-client system. Studying the ways
i
in which Cambodians interact contributes to an explanation of how the secret genocide 
conducted at S-21 and similar centers were planned and executed. Further, it aids in the 
understanding of Khmer Rouge actions apart from torture. Examples of the less physical tactics
1 Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski in Kenneth M. Quinn’s “The Pattern and Scope of Violence” in Cambodia 
1975-1978 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 180.
V /  2 Pol Pot in Kenneth M. Quinn’s “The Pattern and Scope of Violence” in Cambodia 1975-1978 (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), 204.
of the Khmer Rouge include the manipulation of children to worship the Angka (the organization) 
and serve the regime as militant cadres and guards, how city dwellers placidly emptied the cities 
in the initial days of the new regime, and how overt resistance, like armed rebellions or uprisings, 
did not occur against the regime.
Sokhieng Au’s “Indigenous politics, public health, and the Cambodian colonial state” 
served as an intellectual incentive to investigate the generic behaviors of Cambodian 
individuals.3 Although the article covers the behavioral modes of protest and reaction against 
French-implemented medical procedures, her proposed outcome to “support a general aim of 
furthering the understanding of Khmer political behaviour in the colonial period...and provide 
alternative models to the existing trope of Khmer socio-political behaviour” does not alienate her 
research from contributing to a scholarly discussion of the Khmer Rouge. Colonial Khmers used 
a menagerie of tactics against Western medicine, of which they neither understood nor felt it 
necessary with which to comply. So, too, did post-colonial Khmers living in the twentieth 
century use the same or similar tactics against the Khmer Rouge, and vice versa, the Khmer 
Rouge against the Cambodian people.
Au’s delineation of the protest methods used against the France include petition, inaction, 
flight, murder, and manipulation of prevalent social customs to prohibit or delay the French from 
coercing the Khmers to obey the European medical regulations or to prevent the Khmers from 
carrying on with their traditional social customs, such as elaborate funerals for recently deceased, 
wealthy victims of plague. Memoirs written after the Khmer Rouge’s defeat by the Vietnamese 
in the 1970s incorporate elements of the traditional modes of protest Au discovered in her 
research on colonial Cambodia. Despite the gap of centuries, the social order remained
3 Sokhieng Au, “Indigenous politics, public health and the Cambodian colonial state,” South East Asia Research 
(London) 14, no. 1 (Mar 2006), 33-86.
essentially the same; thus, the behavioral backdrop behind these two events has a continuity that 
enables research of totalitarianism in Cambodia. The common denominator is France. Thus, 
colonial France’s manipulation and interpretation of Cambodian history lay at the root of the
Khmer Rouge movement.4
Looking at the Khmer Rouge’s posture during their period in power, it is easy to pick out 
schemas of paranoia and face-saving mechanisms that were familiar to the traditional pre­
revolution Khmer. Much of what other scholars say about Cambodian aggression—including 
the brand of grudge which serves as a catalyst for future violence, kum—has a tendency to 
exclude research outside of direct contact with the negative emotions people experience. Judy 
Ledgerwood’s article “Khmer Kinship: The Matriliny/Matriarchy Myth” and Chhuong’s 
Battambang During the Time o f the Lord Governor offer wonderful academic insights into 
Khmer cultural norms and patterns that contribute, both directly and indirectly, to understanding 
Cambodian wartime behavior.5 In other words, research that focuses strictly on the Khmer 
Rouge once it had achieved power, like David Chandler’s Voices from S-21: Terror and History 
in Pol Pot's Secret Prison, has its uses, although its localized scope of the regime is prohibitive 
to completely answering questions with any level of accuracy of how and why genocide 
developed.6
Cambodians, like many Eastern countries, adhere to a conception of time that contradicts 
the Western linear progression. In the Eastern philosophy, the past exists within the present; this 
means that the sorts of behaviors displayed by Cambodians during the time of French 
colonialism and plague are present during the time of Pol Pot and his genocide. The opinion
4 Cambodge
5 Judy Ledgerwood. “Khmer Kinship: the matriliny/matriarchy myth.” Journal of Anthropological Research. 
(Albuquerque, NM) 51, no. 3 (Fall 1995) 247-261, and ** incomplete citation for Battambang**
6 David Chandler. Voices from S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot’s Secret Prison. (California: University of 
California Press, 1999).
scholars generally take when discussing Cambodian extremes, like rage, is that Cambodians have 
a peculiar degree of emotional acuteness and control not possessed by other cultures; one author 
sophomorically labeled the behavioral peculiarities of Cambodians as “Khmemess,” which can
seep into architecture, trade, and burial rituals.7
Through an examination of sources—to include memoirs, scholastic works, speeches, 
and empirical data of Cambodia, prior to, during, and after the Khmer Rouge—this paper 
concludes that although the conception of “Khmemess” lacks any scholastic backing, there are 
cultural patterns and other indicators of how and why the Khmer Rouge were able to attain and 
maintain their power in the 1970s. That genocide occurred should not come as a shock to any 
scholar of Cambodia. Cambodian grudges, hum, the system of patron-client relationships, 
internal familial organization, the lack of any socially-approved outlet for releasing the initial 
feelings of anger or resentment, the pressure to “save face” and the obligations a Cambodian has 
to his family’s honor all contribute to excessive violence. It was the creation of a regime that 
channeled these behaviors to one focused end that proved explosive on a large scale.
To illustrate the theme of this paper more effectively, I must call upon an analogy of 
Professor Jones’s of Northern Illinois University, concerning the Southeast Asian conception of 
power: like “the force” in Star Wars, power is neither good nor bad until someone harnesses it 
for his personal use. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge took hold of the neutral power of 
traditional modes of behavior—neutral because without manipulation they neither toppled nor 
benefited society as a whole—and exploited them to suit their own purposes. Thus, the genocide 
has cultural origins.
'sw / 7 Ashley Thompson. “Buddhism in Cambodia: rapture and continuity,” in Stephen Berkwitz (ed.) Buddhism in 
world cultures: comparative perspectives (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006), 129-167.
This study is broken into two large blocks, the first of which cycles through some of the 
major characteristics of Cambodian behavior that I deemed especially pertinent to a discussion 
on the Khmer Rouge. Some of the characteristics are peppered with examples from Haing 
Ngor’s memoir, Survival in the Killing Fields, to better illustrate the concept at hand. The 
second part of the essay is concerned with folding the behavioral characteristics into an analysis 
of specific events that occurred under the Khmer Rouge. It is in this second block that the 
research on Democratic Kampuchea is explained through these cultural models.
Khmer Behavior
Westerners seek justice, a repayment of debts for transgressions against them. This repayment is 
usually given by a third party court system; carrying out vendettas and other forms of seeking 
revenge are not socially-approved methods for the blue or white collar workers of America. The 
“eye for an eye” quotation from the Bible best explains the Westerners’ desire in seeking justice 
to level themselves with the aggressor. Reciprocate the hurt, and the transgression is forgotten.
Cambodians, however, seek disproportionate revenge, typically referred to as “a head for 
an eye.” Dr. Ledgerwood of Northern Illinois University recalled a newspaper article published 
after the Khmer Rouge had been overthrown that illustrated disproportionate revenge: a 
Cambodian man had been slighted by another man while out drinking in a bar.8 9 Having kept 
some of his former munitions from the DK era, he went home, retrieved a grenade, and threw it 
in the bar. By killing the man who had made him lose face he was able to stand above him—he 
had vanquished his enemy and proved himself the superior in their relationship.
8 Frank Smith. Interpretative Accounts of the Khmer Rouge Years: Personal Experience in Cambodian Peasant 
World View. (Unpublished paper: 1989).
9 Dr. Ledgerwood, HIST 498J, 22 October 2007.
v , Not all examples of “head for an eye” are so extreme. In this example, the grenade
thrower had been intoxicated and had impaired judgement. Other incidents of a disrespected 
person taking steps to humiliate the person whom had insulted him include public teasing to 
strangers and friends and marrying the sister of an enemy and treating her poorly after he takes 
second and third wives.10 In this last example, the family of the wife was unable to kill the man 
for treating her poorly because she would be a widow, and if she left him she would be a 
divorcee—both of which would incur public shame for her and her family.
Cambodians themselves will admit to suffering from this desire to entirely vanquish their 
enemies. Admittedly, they will do all they can to prevent themselves from reaching the point of 
murder, but all Cambodians are aware that such extreme violence is not outside the realm of 
possibility. An unnamed Cambodian male in his mid-twenties explained the volatility of acting 
on one’s anger.
Since I was little, I have not wanted to argue with anyone. Even if 
another person does something to make me mad, I don’t want to 
argue with them. I try to control my heart (tuap chett). If I argue with 
another person, I might stop speaking to them forever after, but I 
wouldn’t want to fight them. But I know in my heart, if I ever did get 
into a fight with someone, I would beat them until they were no longer 
alive. I would beat them to death at once. I wouldn’t want the person 
to live because I know he would take revenge upon me on a later day.
So I don’t want to argue with anyone.11
This illustrates two extreme ways of dealing with personal grudges, or kum. The first is to cease 
interactions with the person. This quiet, non-confrontational method of controlling anger while 
simultaneously carrying out a personal hatred might last for a period of days or until one of the 
two parties involved in the argument dies (although the death would be natural or accidental, not
10 Alexander Laban Hinton. “Cambodia’s Shadow: The Cultural Origins of Genocide.” (PhD. Dissertation, Emory 
University, 1997.
11 Ibid., 213.
caused by the person with whom he is not speaking). This method of arguing is often difficult to 
resolve, as Cambodians rarely tell one another “I am mad at you” as many Americans would in 
response to an argument, thereby presenting an opportunity for discussion and reconciliation 
over the disagreement.
A silence might receive a temporary truce by one person in the argument claiming a third
party wishes to see the other person, or that a third party misses that other person. One poignant
example of this inclusion of a third party to call a temporary truce to an argument exists in Dr.
Heing Ngor’s memoir, Survival in the Killing Fields. His father had given him a severe beating
as punishment for allegedly stealing from his store. In fact, Ngor had not stolen from his father,
it was his brother. Nevertheless, he was beaten unconscious. Once he came to, he left his family
and lived a quasi-carefree life helping a distant cousin operate his bus-taxi in a nearby rural
village. He did not communicate with his family during this time—he was ready to live on his
own, away from the abuses suffered under his father’s rules. Weeks passed by, and by
happenstance Ngor and his cousin met his father by a roadblock. His father told his cousin,
within earshot of Ngor, that Ngor’s mother was missing her son terribly and that she wonders at
10when he will come home. He neither looked at nor acknowledged Ngor’s presence.
Nevertheless, Ngor understood the message and returned to his mother. The family was reunited, 
and everyone saved face in the process, for his father neither apologized, which would lower his 
status in the family for humbling himself to his son, and his son, upon moving back into the 
house, recognized the traditional order of familial life. His grudge could continue and manifest 
itself in other ways, but not to such a degree that it would publicly shame the family.
^■r/ 12 Dr. Haing Ngor and Roger Warner. Survival in the Killing Fields. (New York: Carroll and Graff Publishers,
1987), 47.
The second way in which the young Cambodian man explained how he might choose to 
deal with a grudge is to kill a man so that he would not have the chance to, in turn, seek 
vengeance on him. Much of the desire to entirely vanquish an enemy results from Cambodians 
seeking to be higher than others, which is directly related to the patron-client relationships that 
characterize nearly all of Cambodia’s social interactions, internal and external. Cambodian 
patron-client relationships are like other patron-client relationships of Southeast Asia. Person A 
will seek the assistance or favor of Person B. Person A is indebted to Person B, whose status has 
risen by adding another person into his circle of people who are partially or wholly dependant 
upon him. The cycle is not limited to Persons A and B; Person A has his own circle of people 
who depend on him, just as Person B is a client to other persons of higher status. These 
intertwined relationship networks are a continuous push-pull in the society in which the patron- 
client system operates. Always, in the Cambodian system, does one seek to have more clients 
than one does patrons; one must always strive to be at the top of his social chain.
In a skewed way, this translates into how Cambodians feel it necessary to eliminate the 
possibility of their enemies striking back at them for any grave offence. The risks of not getting 
rid of an enemy in serious cases could prove fatal, for the enemy could strike back not only at the 
person with whom he was angry, but at his entire family, which would wipe out his line and 
remove the possibility of anyone seeking revenge for this act. It is better to cheat death by 
getting rid of the enemy and his line before he has the chance to get you and yours.
Not every grudge is the result of one incident. Most are a compound reaction to a 
number of insults suffered on one end, and those insults can range in scope and level of 
humiliation endured. Over time, just as in any society, anger that does not have a proper channel
Wof release will explode. It is an obvious conclusion that Cambodians do not often have the 
opportunity to rid themselves of anger in constructive ways.
Killing an enemy is an excessive way of coping with or ridding oneself of anger. This 
extreme reaction is most likely due in part to how anger is internalized in order to save face. 
Saving face, or maintaining an exterior posture that hints at a peaceful home life, external respect, 
and harmony with others, is as integral a component to the Cambodian way of life as is the 
patron-client system; indeed, it is nearly inseparable from it. Saving face is akin to keeping the 
peace among people; avoiding arguments and maintaining cool under pressure are characteristics 
of the Buddhist monks, the moral and religious keepers of Cambodian society. To emulate them 
is to follow a path that is honorable and proper; thus, Cambodians often attempt to repress their 
anger and feel compelled to obey the tacit rules of life. Happiness is essential to the common 
good.13
To borrow another example from Ngor’s memoir: after high school, Ngor went to live 
among the monks, as is tradition in Cambodia. An old monk took to Ngor and explained that all 
that is holy and divine runs though his veins, because it takes a father and a mother to make a 
child. The father and mother protect the child in youth; consequently it is the child’s duty to 
protect and honor the parents when he is older, as well as his relatives who came into the family 
before him—he must always serve and protect them. The monk told him, “Obey your elders, 
boy. If your family is happy, you will have a good life. If all the families are happy, then the 
village will be happy. If all the villages are happy, then the land will be strong and content.”14
13 Serge Thion. “Genocide as a Political Commodity” in Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, 
the United Nations, and the International Community, Ben Kieman, ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Southeast Asia Studies, 1993), 163-190.
14 Ibid., 21.
Obedience is an easy way to save face. If a young Cambodian child does what he is told 
and does not cause problems with rude questions, mischief, or rambunctious behavior, he will do 
his family honor. Young children are taught obedience and the pains of public ridicule at an 
early age. Humiliation is incorporated into primary school-levels of education, as teachers often 
force students to stand up in class if they get an answer wrong and remain standing until 
someone answers it correctly, and parents do not hesitate to threaten to give children away to 
strangers if they maintain obnoxious antics.15 Whether the children realize it at the time or not, 
both standing up in a room of their seated peers and threats of being sold are forms of losing face 
that are directly related to issues of obedience.
For example, a son who steals from his father’s business by skimming money from the 
accounts makes his father lose credibility, both for raising a disobedient son and for having been 
swindled by a relative, whereas a son who goes to medical school and doctors his father when ill 
allows his father to boast of such an intelligent and respectful (read: obedient) son, thereby 
gaining face.16
One particularly striking example of face and familial loyalty that occurred after the
Khmer Rouge took control of the country and evacuated the cities was in a refugee camp. Even
here, Ngor explained, having face was important. Once reunited with his father and mother, he
had found a traditional-style Cambodian home in which to live—a small enclosed room standing
on stilts several feet high to save it from the monsoon rains.
Now that I was reunited with my family I was nearly content. Family 
is the glue that holds society together. Life makes more sense for 
being connected to the past through parents, and to the future through 
children. Being together also had its practical benefits. For one, more 
people to rely on in case of emergencies. For another, more food,
15 Hinton, 192.
16 Dr. Haing Ngor and Roger Warner. Survival in the Killing Fields. (New York: Carroll and Graff Publishers, 
1987), 47.
> .  because my family had stockpiled food and taken it with them from the
city. And finally, I had gained face for bringing the family into the house, 
because I had done my duty as a son; and my father had gained face 
because I had put him literally above me.17
Even after the Khmer Rouge attempted to eliminate all previous social norms and familial 
loyalty, people held fast to their time-honored traditions. This will be discussed in further detail 
in the following section of the paper, Behavior under the Khmer Rouge Regime.
Behavior under the Khmer Rouge Regime
Given what we know of Cambodian behavior—that they are generally peaceful because of their 
internalized anger, which can erupt when the right trigger mechanism is squeezed—let us now 
examine what it is that happened under the rule of the Khmer Rouge.
The Khmer Rouge focused on recruiting from the countryside. Although Sihanouk, the 
beloved former ruler who had been overthrown in a coup by Lon Nol, took pains to ensure all of 
the children received quality education—he dedicated twenty-five percent of the national budget 
to that specific effort—the country children were those whose minds typically did not grasp the 
Western-style lessons of world history and mathematics.18 The Khmer Rouge took advantage of 
the relatively uneducated boys and girls, whose racial purity as “dark, ethnic Khmer” often 
contrasted highly with the lighter skin tones of those who lived in the city. The Khmer Rouge 
zeroed in on a few key sensitivities of the native Cambodian: exalting the past glory of the 
Khmer race, with Angkor Wat as its symbol of its former achievement and status, the Khmer 
Rouge positioned itself as nearly inseparable from their impressive past by referring to itself as 
the Angka, meaning organization, which is similar in sound and spelling to Angkor. There had
17 Dr. Haing Ngor and Roger Warner. Survival in the Killing Fields. (New York: Carroll and Graff Publishers, 
W  1987), 113.
18 Elizabeth Becker. When the War was Over. (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 6.
, been, too, an unspoken tension between the wealthy city people and the poor country rice
farmers.19 The perception that they toiled endlessly and received little for their pains due to a 
prohibitive tax infrastructure and a culture of bonjour, a French word that, among other 
meanings, traditionally translates into “hello,” although in Cambodian slang is used to label the 
required bribing, skimming from the top, and unpaid favors the government officials require the 
peasants to pay or give in order to conduct business without hassle.20 Bonjour is a word for 
corruption; under the Lon Nol regime corruption grew at an insufferable pace.
Additionally, the organization was smart about how it required its members to refer to 
one another, its use of the traditional and respectful way of calling a respected individual Brother 
or Grandfather.21 2This helped to both exalt the individual in power and it eased the transition for 
those youths who joined the movement and abandoned their families. It was within the Khmer 
Rouge that they had a Father or a Sister; not at home. It was successful in replacing the family 
structure for its lowest members; those who had actual authority in the government still held fast 
to their former, pre-revolutionary, conceptions of family honor and face.
Using those three strategies as the base-layer recruitment schemes, the Khmer Rouge 
were able to recruit successfully among the peripheral members of society and the poor. It was 
the poor, in fact, who were the exalted members and cherished within the group for their purity; 
not surprisingly, the DK’s communist leanings preferred the farmers to the intellectual. It is easy, 
therefore, to comprehend how the country-versus-city tension could bubble over into outright 
violence, as it did, when examining the relationship with kum in mind. Years of bribing,
19 Becker, ##.
20 Ngor. Survival in the Killing Fields, 25. ‘Bonjour, mon ami? my brother said sarcastically, quoting one of the 
few French phrases he knew. Bonjour had two meanings. Leterally it was a greeting like “hello”, but the French 
practice of shaking hands offered a chance to pass folded money from one palm to another. In Cambodian slang, 
bonjour meant graft.
W  21 Chandler.
22 Chandler—Brother Number One.
working hard in the hot Cambodian sun in a rice field to have but a portion of the crop left after 
taxes and bonjour contrasted sharply with images of city people eating in restaurants and driving 
Mercedes cars; the Khmer Rouge looked to the eighty-five percent of the Khmers living in the 
country for their base of support, following a popular Leninist “fundamental law”: “Only when 
the ‘lower classes’ do not want the old way, and then the upper classes cannot carry on in the old 
way—only then can revolution triumph.”23
The patron-client theme presented in the first section of the paper was a sensitive point in
the recruitment of the country people for the Khmer Rouge. A Khmer Rouge cadre member,
Pram Pal, was partially responsible for propaganda work among the peasants living in Kreng
Beng village. Although she had been imprisoned in S-21 a few years later, she “confessed” to
promising country people that they could achieve higher status if they worked with her—playing
on the traditional patron-client theme in Khmer society. With a deep-rooted desire to be a
“bigger” man, more important, and above others, her psychology was important in getting the
numbers the organization needed to sustain the revolution. She confessed that she would say,
Uncle, you have worked in the rice fields since you were a child;
Uncle you don’t have enough food; [they] control things and you 
still don’t have enough...Uncle, you work for the Republic but 
you do not have a high rank and after winning you will only work 
in the ricefields... Your children will only remain rice farmers, too.
But if uncle wants to become a big man he will have to fight the 
Republic. That was the only way he could become a big man.24
Pram Pal used standard Cambodian methods of respect, calling her potential recruit “Uncle” and
promising upward mobility and a better life for his family. It is quite clear that Uncle, whoever
23 V.I. Lenin, “Left Wing Comminism” in Selected Works.
24 Pram Pal, “Confession.” Toul Sleng, 1978.
he was, could pick out the possibility of a better way of life not only for himself, but for his
W
children—that working for the Khmer Rouge meant honor for his line.
Once folded into the Angka, the individual Khmer Rouge underwent a series of classes 
for indoctrination.25 6 Because many of the recruits were typically uneducated, the political 
reeducation often ignored the finer points of political doctrine and focused on unleashing internal 
rage. They followed the system even when it appeared as though it might fail, for without 
knowledge of the fundamentals of politics, it was unlikely that they could identify the 
incongruities of doctrine when compared with the reality of the party’s organization and 
purpose.27
Chandler dedicates an entire chapter in his book on S-21 explaining the backgrounds of 
the workers who interrogated, guarded, and helped to perform the low-level work for the facility. 
Most had joined the revolution when they were young—some as young as ten years old.28 He 
also examines the roots of obedience, a character trait that is at an early age reinforced in 
Cambodian youth in schools. Public ridicule, tied to the theme of saving face, produces a level 
of obedience. But can this level of indoctrinated obedience, the face-saving measures, and the
25 That the paper omits mention of the Khmer Rouge’s coercive tactics in attaining recruits does not mean that they 
did not influence the development of the party. One examples of their subversive recruitment techniques includes 
vans driving to the entrances of movie theatres on Friday nights. When young men left the show, the Khmer Rouge 
would grab them up, stuff them in the van, and drive away. For an article on the lack of popular support for the 
Khmer Rouge, see Kate G. Frieson. “Revolution and Rural Response in Cambodia: 1070-1975” in Genocide and 
Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International Community, Ben Kieman, ed. 
(New Haven, CT: Yale Monogrpah Series, University of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993.).
26 Chandler. Pol Pot plans the future.
27 Ngor’s memoir includes a brief conversation he overheard between a fellow doctor and a friend about what the 
Khmer Rouge actually were on their lowest level. His friend had commented that the soldiers did not even know 
they were communists: “When have you ever heard them use the word ‘communist’?” “That’s true,” said the 
paediatrician after a moment’s thought “But what are they?” “K um -m onussI said...It was a play on words: kum, 
the long-standing grudge that finally explodes in disproportionate revente, and mouss, meaning people. “That’s 
what they are at the lower level, revenge people. All they know is that city people like us used to lord it over them 
and this is their chance to get back. That’s what they are, communist at the top and kum-mounss at the bottom.” 
Ngor, 171
28 Chandler. S-21.
devotion to a family (either biological or manufactured), upon political tweaking, be enough to 
induce someone to kill and participate in genocide?
W
On Killing: The Psychological Cost o f Learning to Kill in War and Society is an 
American book that examines specific, American battles and encounters. Yet its findings 
easily translate into the situation of 1970s Cambodia and offers insights into the lower-level 
perpetrators’ minds. The famous Milgram study conducted at Yale University examined the 
innate obligation a person feels to carry out the orders given by someone in a position of 
authority. Participants of the experiment were led to a room with a person in a chair. They were 
to administer levels of electrical shocks according to what a man in lab coat ordered. Despite 
seeing that they were causing the person being electrocuted physical pain, many continued to 
increase the voltage on command. As this example is a more controlled experiment of one 
method of torture at S-21, the situation easily translates to Cambodia’s genocide and torture 
methods. Because many of the men working in S-21 felt an obligation to authority, their man in 
the white lab coat was replaced by the Angka—the nameless, faceless body to whose revolution 
they were participants.
Not only did the Khmer Rouge cadre who committed genocide feel an obligation to 
authority, but they felt what Grossman identifies as “anonymity and group absolution”, meaning 
that as long as he can share the blame among his peers who are performing the same duties, he 
can reconcile his actions. This is a natural phenomena, occurring not only among soldiers on a 
battlefield, but within any group in which taking life is a possibility, such as street gangs or 
mafias. Therefore, the man is not the killer, but the group is. 2930
29 LTC Dave Grossman. On Killing: The Psychological Cost o f Learning to Kill in War and Society. (New York: 
VsW  Bay Back Books, 1996).
30 Ibid., 141-142.
...Groups also enable killing through developing in their members a 
sense o f anonymity that contributes to further violence. In some 
circumstances this process o f group anonymity seems to facilitate a kind 
o f  atavistic killing hysteria that can also be seen in the animal kingdom. 
Kruck’s 1972 research describes scenes from the animal kingdom that 
show that senseless and wanton killing does occur. They include the 
slaughter o f gazelles by hyenas, in quantities way beyond their need or 
capacity to eat...Shalit points out that * such senseless violence in the 
animal world— as well as most o f  the violence in the human domain— is 
shown by groups rather than by individuals.
Many survivors of the Cambodian holocaust who are willing to talk about their experiences as 
Khmer Rouge militants and perpetrators of violence usually recall their actions as a  means o f self- 
preservation.31 While self-preservation might have been a conscious rationalization for their participation, 
the influence o f  the group is just as real, if  not a more authentic, reason for them to have killed.32
The group mentality is a component of the upbringing that Cambodian children receive 
while in primary school, as mentioned earlier. Public shaming, losing face, and familial 
obligation all contribute to reinforce a person’s identification of himself as being of the group, 
not apart from it. The nature of the Khmer Rouge as a military organization incorporated this 
organic group mentality of the animal kingdom into their indoctrination process; all military 
organizations do this in order to function. But they also went a step further in choosing their 
soldiers and cadre from a specific racial and economic background. They selected the dark 
skinned Cambodians of the countryside to fill their ranks. This external similarity made 
identification of members of the group especially easy; dark skin meant an ally, light skin meant 
an enemy.
Even today, Cambodians will talk about the racial differences between the Khmer Rouge 
and the other Cambodians who were the victims of their revolution. Cambodians traditionally
31 S21: The Khmer Rouge Killing Machine, DVD, directed by Rithy Panh (2002; First Run Features, 2005).
32 May Ebihara, “Revolution and Reformation in Kampuchean Village Culture” in The Cambodian Agony, David A. 
Albin and Marlowe Hood, eds. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990),16-61.
stereotype dark skin with poverty and manual labor and light skin with wealth and comfort. One 
scholar who had spent time with Cambodian peasants remarked that many of them whom he 
interviewed about the Khmer Rouge “regularly refer.. .to the Khmer Rouge as aa khmau, which 
loosely translates as ‘those black bastards.’ A high percentage of the Khmer Rouge rank and file 
were apparently from the poorest rural areas of Cambodia, where Khmers tend to have very dark 
skin.”33 The Khmer Rouge found prime candidates for soldiers in the countryside of Cambodia, 
having all the prerequisites to become obedient, faithful servants of the Angka: uneducated, 
young, suffering from economic repression and poverty, and enjoying racial similarity.
Other theories posit that Buddhism itself contributed to the genocide. In addition to the
obedience imbedded in Cambodians throughout their youth, the religious and moral keepers of
society, the monks, reinforce the behavioral characteristic. The Khmer Rouge leadership
exploited the benefits of such religious indoctrination, but desired to eliminate the source of it—
the religion itself. Taking hold of a fear of the patron-client relationship, the Angka feared that
its client, the Buddhist monks and lay practitioners, would rise and attack the organization and
the revolution. The rationale behind this was simple:
While the Constitution [of Democratic Kampuchea] ford not explicitly name 
Buddhism [as a religion to be banned], it is clear from DK rhetoric and actions 
that Buddhism...was considered reactionaiy, feudalists, and exploitative.
Buddhism, of course, would have competed with the state for manpower, 
resources, and loyalties. DK class analysis categorized monks as belonging to a 
“special class” and comparable to “subcapitalists” or petty bourgeoisie;...the 
other-worldly orientation of Buddhist teachings was viewed as detrimental to 
Democratic Kampuchea’s desire for active transformation of this world.34
Like everything the Khmer Rouge did, there was a semblance of order and reason behind the
choice to eliminate Buddhism entirely from the lives of the citizenry. Yun Yat, the minister of
33 Frank Smith. Interpretative Accounts of the Khmer Rouge Years: Personal Experience in Cambodian Peasant 
World View. (Unpublished paper: 1989).
34 May Ebihara, “Revolution and Reformation in Kampuchean Village Culture” in The Cambodian Agony, David A. 
Albin and Marlowe Hood, eds. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990),33.
education and propaganda and wife of a party leader, explained, “Under the old regime peasants 
believed in Buddhism, which the ruling class utilized as a propaganda instrument. With the 
development of revolutionary consciousness, the people stopped believing the bonzes and left 
the temples. The problem gradually becomes extinguished. Hence there is no problem.”35
Buddhism as doctrine seeps into a number of crevices. To look at it from the Khmer 
Rouge leadership angle is to identify a potential enemy, a usurper of personnel and resources, 
and a purveyor of a dissenting ideology, one that preaches against ignorance and that focuses on 
human bonds. Understandably, the Khmer Rouge felt the need to eliminate the threats against 
their party to best achieve the highest likelihood of success in their program. To consider 
Buddhism from the victim’s point of view, many Cambodians felt they were suffering from bad 
Karma produced in a previous life; that their lifespan included the Khmer Rouge regime induced 
much guilt. Ngor’s religious principles caused him similar worry in the early days of the Khmer 
Rouge takeover of Phnom Penh. To him, karma was important, but any existential punishment 
he might have incurred through bad karma did not alter his plans to fight the regime. He 
believed if the people could not fight them physically, then it was important to fight them in their 
minds.36
Other Cambodians he recalled, those belonging to the more mystical sects of Buddhism, 
felt old prophesies were coming true. Some predictions were from the traditional Khmer canon 
of folklore that includes various omens of ill-fortune, such as the observation of a white 
crocodile or the rusting of the royal sword. Other signs, however, were a part of put tuminay,
35 DesMoines Register, 1978.
36 Dr. Haing Ngor and Roger Warner. Survival in the Killing Fields. (New York: Carroll and Graff Publishers, 
1987), 169.
meaning “Buddhist predictions.”37 The entire population of Cambodia was familiar with these
stories, which included rumors that their enemies will empty the cities after a social catastrophe,
the persecution of Buddhists by their enemies, and the rise of the uneducated to positions of
authority. A few examples of superstitions highlight the ease with which Cambodians could
apply the stories to the actual events that occurred in the wake of the Khmer Rouge takeover.
A ferocious, bloodthirsty spirit, the king o f  the demons, will come from 
[a distant province] and enter into the hearts o f the people, to create 
disorder in every city.. .to cause the people to think that wrong is right, 
that black is white, that good is bad.
They will take the bribes o f others, until no more o f them remain. They 
will then flee to live in a foreign countiy, in the rural areas, by way o f 
the forest, and their health will return. At that time, they will depend on 
the assistance o f foreigners; they will exist with the help o f others 
[instead o f by their own efforts]...39
Clearly, any basic knowledge on the Khmer Rouge’s rise to power can fill in the holes created by 
these prophesies. Understandably, the citizenry would look to their old methods of explanation 
to rationalize the happenings of the Khmer Rouge takeover and their subsequent destruction. If 
they had believed in karma, it is not impossible to conceive of hundreds, perhaps hundreds of 
thousands, of Buddhist Cambodians resigning to their fates, as the prophesies had foretold of the 
coming of the Khmer Rouge.
Conclusion
The lack of ethnic uniformity among the Cambodians was an integral component in enabling the 
genocide. By first separating the ethnic Cambodians from the mixed blood Cambodians and 
foreigners, the Khmer Rouge intensified the degree of separation between them. The rural
37 Frank Smith. Interpretative Accounts of the Khmer Rouge Years: Personal Experience in Cambodian Peasant 
WorldView. (Unpublished paper: 1989), 19.
W  38 Ibid., 20.
39 Ibid., 21.
prejudices against the prosperous city dwellers, graft, the patron-client system and other 
traditional Cambodian social customs and modes of upbringing all contributed to the ease with 
which the Khmer Rouge was able to recruit members to fill its ranks and carry out its program of 
destruction.
The proposed model is an organic one, and relatively easy to understand: instead of 
wondering what external factors contributed to the development of the regime, look at the 
characteristics and habits of the people who conducted the genocide. The external influences 
certainly exaggerated the percentages of recruits and tenacity with which the Khmer Rouge 
operated, but ‘exaggerated’ and ‘produced’ are important differences. Many scholars 
erroneously point to the American bombing campaign as one of the causes of the high level of 
recruitment of Cambodian countrymen into the Khmer Rouge.40 If anything, the bombing was a 
secondary cause; the initial reasons for their participation in the political movement included the 
ones mentioned above: economics, traditional modes of retaliation, race, and lack of quality 
education.41
Scholars cannot judge a culture for being predisposed to violence. Violence is a human 
experience, a universal code in which even the most docile cultures participate. Like the 
Cambodians, one anthropologist noted, Germans have similar cultural obligations and practices 
that had made them susceptible to the mass extermination of Jews and other minorities during 
World War II. The reasons are internal—like the test subjects who electrocuted the victims 
simply because a man in a lab coat said to, both Cambodians and Germans were playing on 
programmed responses to authority. It is when the rationalization becomes ‘the Germans had 
pre-existing hatred of the Jews’ and ‘because the rural Cambodians had struggled for years under
40 Eva Myslliwiec, Kampuchea Punishing the Poor: The International Isolation o f Kampuchea. (Oxford: Oxfam, 
1988), 2.
41 The Cambodian Agony.
a regime that encouraged oppressive taxation and graft and therefore learned to hate capitalism’ 
that the beginnings of comprehension about genocidal motivation begins.
When the questions turn to the motivation of the trigger pullers—not just the ideological 
roots of hatred and means—that the universal experience of killing and death becomes the focus. 
The theory of group dynamics as an enabler is particularly persuasive; genocide is not limited to 
one culture or one person. Pol Pot has the finger pointed at him for being the mastermind, but 
there are different reasons for the actions taken by the leadership on different levels. Pol Pot 
might have been among the few humans who enjoy killing, or he could have been so emotionally 
distant from the killing that it had little effect on his actions. Whatever his motivation, the 
Cambodian people at large, specifically the rural peasants who cooperated with the Khmer 
Rouge have telling characteristics that highlight the tendency of their culture to commit these
sorts of crimes.
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